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Roundtable: The Politics of Culture and Identity in
Contemporary Nepal
Organizers: William F. Fisher and Susan Hangen
Panelists: Karl-Heinz Kramer, Laren Leve, David
Romberg, Mukta S. Tamang, Judith
Pettigrew,and Mary Cameron
William F. Fisher and Susan Hangen
Introduction

local populations involved in and affected by the janajati
movement in Nepal.

In the years since the 1990 "restoration" of democracy,
ethnic activism has become a prominent and, for some, a
worrisome part of Nepal's political arena. The "janajati"
movement is composed of a mosaic of social organizations
and political parties dominated by groups of peoples who
have historically spoken Tibeto-Burman languages. This
movement has reshaped political discourse in Nepal by persistently challenging the previously-accepted view of national culture, religion, and language, and by presenting a
potentially revolutionary vision of Nepal as a multi-cultural,
multi-linguistic, and multi-religious state. This conflict pits
anger and resentment about the two-hundred-year-history
of economic, political, and cultural dominance of Nepal
by high-caste hill Hindus against fears that Nepal is on the
verge of violent disintegration that would make it another
Sri Lanka or Yugoslavia.

We asked the roundtable participants to consider several themes that derived from our own discussion:

This roundtable brought together scholars who have
conducted extensive research on different dimensions of
the janajati movement to share their perspectives, explore
the divergent and sometimes contradictory modes of activism in the janajati movement, and to discuss the changes
that are occurring as new organizations emerge, actors reposition themselves, and new issues arise. 1 The
roundtable's primary goal was to explore in some depth
the complex and changing nature of relationships among
various actors, social organizations, political parties, and

1

Roundtable was part of the Annual Meeting of the Assqciation
of Asian Studies, held in Boston, MA on March 12, 1999.
Roundtable participants included William Fi sher, David
Gellner, Susan Hangen, Karl-Heinz Kramer, Lauren Leve,
Kathryn March, and Mukta Singh Tamang. Addition extended
comments were provided by David Holmberg, Judith Pettigrew,
and Mary Cameron.
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1. To what extent and to what end does it make sense
to talk about a "janajati movement"? Reflecting a wide
variety of intentions, goals, definitions, and strategies, do
the wide-ranging practices of activists in social organizations and constitute a movement or are they but a discordant set of disparate actions? To what extent are groups
like the MNO or the Janajati Mahasangh engaged in the
same project?
2. How significant is the distinction between social
and political spheres in Janajati discourse? Some Janajati
activists take pains to distinguish between activities and
groups that are part of a Janajati social movement, on one
hand, and those which are part of a Janajati political movement, on the other. While this distinction appears on the
surface to echo distinctions made by social movement theorists, we might question how cleanly this demarcation can
be drawn . What is the relationship between new assertions of social and political identity and attempts to create
effective political strategies?
3. How do post-1990 ethnic social and political organizations differ in form, membership, and in the issues they
address from those which existed during the Panchayat era?
How have previously existing ethnic organizations re-positioned themselves and re-cast their historical narratives
in the post-Panchayat era?
4. How does the work of foreign and Nepali scholars
articulate with contemporary ethnic politics in Nepal? How
have the ways in which sc holars have classified difference
in Nepa l influenced or informed the strategies contemporary political activists employ to assert or re-classify difference?
5. How does the Janajati movement articulate with in
a larger frame encompassing the politics of difference in
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contemporary Nepal, includin g the politics of class, gender, and geography?

William F. Fisher, Chair
Opening Remarks
I welcome everyone to the AAS roundtable on the Politics of Culture and Iden tity in Contemporary Nepal. We
are fortunate to have here today a wide range of schol ars
who have conducted research on different aspects of the
Janaj ati movement. I will start with some background remarks to help frame and initiate our exchange.
Within Nepal there are widespread di sagreements about
th ~ seriousness of Nepal 's "ethnic problem", the threat it
poses to national integration, and its ca uses. Some say that
the Janajati problem is one of the most serious problems
faced by Nepal at the moment but others argue that the
current furor is merely the work of a few disgruntled ethnic elites in Kathmandu, who are out for personal ga in ,
and some even point to the complicity of foreign scholars
in emphasizing ethnic differences and promoting a critical
view of the two hundred year hi story of nation building in
Nepal.
Some of my high cas te informants hav e said
di sm iss ively that the whole Janaj ati movement could be
ended with just 20 or so hi gh go vernment appointments .
When I paraphrased these claims to Janaj ati activists they
laughed and noted that they too had heard these remarks.
But they interpreted comments like thi s as signs of growing respec t for the movement since the estimated number
of government appointments needed to end the movement
had apparently doubled within one year.
Scholars, too, have quest ioned the size of the janajati
move ment and challenged or di sm iss the authenticity or
sign ificance of views ex pressed by a collection of ethnic
"elites" or "intellectuals." One oftod ay's participants, in a
recent volume, has cautioned us not to unquestioningly
"give full credence to the most vocal and most active proponents of ethnic identity" and has rem inded us of the "duty
to pay attention to the values and world views of ordin ary
people."' I agree with thi s view but offer an addition al
caut ion. It is apparent that what appears on the surface to
be a res urge nce of traditional ethnic identities in Nepal is,
at least in part, a se lective intellectual construction oriented
as much to th e future as to the past, and as much toward
the modern as it is to the traditional. Janajati activists are

2
Dav id Gellner. 1997. "Ethni cit y and Nationalism in the
World 's only Hindu State," in Natioualis111 and Ethuicity in a
Hindu Kiugdo111. Eds. David N. Gellner. Joanna PfaffCzarnecka. and John Welpton. Harwood. pp. 19, 23.
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negotiating identities as they move toward modernity their
own terms.
But while everyday li ves are important anthropological material, we would be ill -advised to treat some peop le
as more "ordinary" than others and thus more worthy of
study, and we risk oversimplification if we focus on some
momentary lack of fit between what activists say and the
feelings of those on whose behalf they claim to speak, and
then take this lack of fit to be evidence of how unauthentic
the voices of ethnic activists are. Tracking a movement is
not merely a matter of assessing the size of the constituency at a particular moment, but also entails close attention to both the persistent assertion of new views, hi stories, categori es, and perspectives as well as the resona nce
of so me of these assertions with a wider population.
The innovative narratives of the activists may notalways reflect change that has already happened in the villages, but we should bea r in mind that the politics of cul ture entails simultaneous battle at numerous levels in various political and geographic spaces. It would be ironic if
as anthropologists we emphasize the need to listen to and
make space for previously unheard voices but at the same
time dismiss some voices by insisting that we are the best
determiners of whose voices are ordinary or authentic
enough to be heard.
Depending on the speaker, current ethnic unrest is attributed to a variety of causes . Ethnic ac tivists attribute it
to two hundred years of Hindu oppression and growing
awareness of this history among affected social groups. But
less charitable views portray it as a misunderstanding and
misuse of new democratic processes and political freedom
to promote what are essentiall y commtmal claims. In the
judgement of thi s latter group, there is no basis for the fear
of ethnic conflict at the grass roots level or among rural
areas in Nepal.
At the heart of the debate about identity, difference and
national culture are two co~11peting views of the nation of
Nepa l. One portrays a democratic Hindu kingdom composed of a harmonious flower ga rden of four vamas and
36 jats which share a heroic past, speak a common language, follow a common reli gion , and are led, at least sy mbolically, by a divine and benevolent king. A second view
opposes a Nepali past of internal colonization, Hindu oppression, and the forced assimilation of non-Hindu minorities into a hierarchi ca l syste m, to an emerge nt vision of
Nepal as a "nation in th e makin g" . In this view, thi s "nation in th e making" if it is to achi eve nationhood at all, can
onl y do so as a culturally plural and secular soc iety.
For many residents in Nepal, the term "janajati," at least
as it is cutTently used, seemed to appea r almost overnight
and within a few years had become widely used and ac-
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knowledged. The term became popular in the mid 1980s
among a small group of ethnic activists who deliberately
translated into English as "nationalities" and employed it
to draw attention to their argument that Nepali society consists of a number of different but equal nationalities which
collectively constitute the nation. It become common on
the national scene by the mid 1990s. The ambiguity of the
English definition for "nationalities" is also consistent with
the different claims and strategies which are present in the
janajati movement: "nationalities" may refer to "groups of
people, each of which has a common and distinguishing
linguistic and cultural background and form one constituent element of a larger group (as a nation)" or it may also
suggest that each of these aggregations of people is "potentially capable of forming a nation state."3
The Janajati activists have set out not only to oppose
what they describe as a state-created and maintained system of social hierarchy but also to demarcate and shape a
new social system-one that is non-hierarchical and nondiscriminatory. They set out to do this through a number
of interrelated strategies: I) They challenge the symbols
of the nation, subversively appropriate and recodify signs,
and look within their own group's history and traditions
for symbols of unity around which their community may
be re-imagined and mobilized. It is in this process that
social groups may become political entities-nationalities-which may begin to bargain with the state for increased social, political, and economic rights of their citizens. 2) They legitimize their actions by citing a history of
subordination, land theft, and slavery at the hands of the
ruling elite. 3) They emphasize a number of stark dichotomies: janajati and jati, indigenous and non-indigenou s,
Hindu and Non -Hindu, flat nose and pointy nose, all of
which call attention to ongoing processes of discrimination . 4) They establish new sets of categories within which
to locate peoples: foremost in this process is a re-writing
of their community histories and a demand for a reconceived national historical narrative. They also embrace
previously despised characterizations and reinterpret them
with positive attributes.

Year of Indigenous People also makes this concern very
clear:
"We, the indigenous people of Nepal, wish to protect
our ethn ic identities ... and we are working to redesctibe history. We want to write our hi stories ourselves.
The government that has been ruling has been covering up the true facts about indi genous people, and has been
describing, writing, and publishin g hi story form imperialist and internal colonialist perspectives. We want to announce that, on the religious front, we are free from the
country and the state's constitution, and want to act
accordingly ... we have been divided by the cultural and
political repression of Hindu nationalism. We want to be
equals again. We want to use our ancestral land , sources
and media freely again ... Our culture is caught between the
unjust Hindu culture and the excessively liberal Western
culture .. .Instead of increasing the standard of living of
janajati peoples, development projects conducted by the
governmental and nongovernmental organizations actually
decrease it and act to eliminate cultural identity... we want
a soc iety unified in diversity."5
The counter natTatives of nationalism put forth by the
janajati are often dismissed as a strange brew of facts, fictions, and myths. Indeed, some of the details of these stories may not stand up to intense academic scrutiny and may
be justifiably labeled confused. But these natTatives are
more about emotion than reason and the model of ethnically plural nationalism they promote may indeed prove
more viable and endurable than state-imposed integration
based on suppression, exclusions, and intolerance.
It is ironic that a state which classified and divided its
population as a means to assimilate and rule the diverse
segments through a state-sanctioned hierarchy must now
find a way to address the insistence of these diverse segments that national unity can emerge through acceptance
of them as separate and different elements of the population.

Stokely Carmichael noted the importance of this kind
of process:

David Gellner
Bmne/ University, London

"the basic need is to reclaim history and identity from what
must be called cultural tetTori sm ... we shall have to struggle
for the right to create our own terms through which to define ourselves and our relationship to the society and to
•
have these terms recognize". 4

Before responding to the question s which the organizers have asked us to address, I would like to make three
preliminary points.
First of all, the organizers refer to some people's "fears

The report of Nepal's National Committee for the UN

.1See, for instance, the unabridged Oxford English Dictionary.
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•carmichael, S. and C.V. Hamilton. 1967. Black Power: The
Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Vintage.
5
National Committee for the International Year of the World'
Indi ge nous Peoples. 1993. " Indi ge nous People of Nepal."
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of violent di sintegration" in the face of identity politics in
Nepal. But that process has already begun: large tracts of
the western hills are not fully or at all controlled by the
government, but the main actor here is the CPN (Maoist).
The relationship between the Maoists and the Janajati activists is by no means straightforward, but there are some
links. And, of course, ethnic identity can play a role even
when it is not consciously a principle of recruitment or organization. My point is that we should be discussing the
Maoist problem at the same time.
Second, a methodological point. As scholars we are
always a step behind. Things happen on the ground and
we are not always there. Even if we are 'there,' participant
observation is not sufficient to grasp a complex phenomenon like 'the Janajati movement.' A variety of methods,
and the cooperation of many different scholars, as in the
present panel, are necessary.
My third point is on the ethics of involvement. Some
people say, 'Don't get involved, don ' t offer advice. You'll
only look stupid; and, in any case, it is patronizing to offer
advice.' Others would say, 'There is --at some point-- a
duty to get involved and not to maintain the Olympian detachment of the armchair observer.' For myself, I believe
that scholars working in Nepal do have a duty to concern
themselves with ethnic politics, and to do so in all humility. They also have a duty not to become the mouthpiece
of nationalist movements, but to represent, or at least to be
aware of, the full plurality of ordinary people's voices .
Turning now to Bill and Susan's questions: they have
asked us, 'Who are the activists?' In the case of the Newars
my estimate is that there are 1-200 people, more if you
include all the students who do no more than organize and
publish campus magazines in Newari. They are, however,
just the tip of an iceberg. The concerns they articulate and
the rhetoric they use go much wider and deeper. They can,
on occasion, mobilize quite large numbers of people, e.g.
for the Bhintuna celebration at the beginning of the so-called
Newar New Year. There is an important split between the
ethnic and the Buddhist activists (the latter being more
numerous) . There is some overlap of the two groups: a
few people are equally active in both spheres. But for the
most part, activists EITHER give priority to Buddhism -in which case they want to reach the largest audience possible, and therefore use Nepali as well as Newari; and they
want to reform, i.e. to change, traditional Newar culture-OR they are cultural nationalists whose prime aims are to
preserve both Newari and traditional Newar cultyre.

6

On the question of the social versus the political in activist discourse: it is essential for ethni c activists to try and
keep party politics out of their organizations . Why? Since
1990 everything has become political. Trade unions have
all split along pmty lines . Any organization that wants to
maintain its unity and build a mass organization (the dream
of every activist) must stop the politically active being
prominent in the organization. If well-known political figures are office holders in an ethnic organization, then the
organization is assumed to be aligned to their party (this
happened, for example, to the Nepal Bhasa Manka Khalah,
headed by Padma Ratna Tuladhar). This immediately alienates potential members who are supporters of the other
parties. In order to prevent this happening the Jyapu
Mahaguthi has a rule baiTing the politically active from
holding office within the organization, though they are
welcome as ordinary members. This is intended to prevent the organization being hijacked by a particular political party, and to try and ensure that the organization continues to represent all Jyapus (effectively: all Jyapus of
Kathmandu, and some outlying villages; Lalitpur has its
own Jyapu organization). By maintaining a distance from
political parties, ethnic organizations can hope to encourage a kind of bidding process between the parties to win
their support, and indeed there is some evidence that this
has been happening.
I don't want to go on too long, so let me conclude. I
think that the way forward for the Nepalese state is to endorse some form of what has been called 'strategic essentialism' . It should give some kind of recognition to some
ethnic groups, i.e. continue the first multiculturalist steps
that have already been taken. Whether these policies should
include quotas or reservations for public sector jobs, educational opportunities, and seats in assemblies, as in India,
is one of the most difficult current questions of Nepali politics. At the same time the state should attempt to encourage multiple and cross- cutting identities, including a common Nepaliness .
Susan Hangen
Department of Anthropology, University of WisconsinMadison

The "Janajati" Movement: A View fmm East Nepal
We are Mongol, we are Mongol,
No matter what others call us,
We are Mongol.
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While researching the Mongol National Organization
(MNO) in eastern Nepal , I heard ac tivists sing the refrain
of thi s song at numerous politica l gatherings. The term
"Mongol" hails from early 19th century ethnology and hi ghlights the idea of racial unity among the numerous groups
of peoples who have historically spoken Tibeto-Burman
languages . As this song suggests, the MNO asserts this
ethnonym in a field in which other people call "Mongols"
other names. By insisting on the term Mongol , the MNO
rejects both the label "matwali," issued by the 19th century Nepali state, and the label "janajati" which has become prevalent in the post 1990 wave of ethnic activism in
Nepal. The MNO's rejection of the term "janajati" is at
once an acknowledgment that the party operates in a wider
field of activism, the "janajati" movement, and a way of
locating itself within that movement.
As one of several ethnic political parties that has
emerged since 1990, the MNO positions itself in the movement as a "political" rather than a "social" organization .
The MNO sees political power as "the main key that can
open all locks" for Mongols and seeks to gain control of
the Nepali state - through elections, if possible, or by
armed revolution if not. Their plans to transform the state
so that it benefits Mongols include: restructuring Nepal as
a federation of states where Tibeto-Burman languages are
used and abolishing the monarchy, which it sees as a buttress of Hindu dominance.

sent so as to secure registration from the Election Commission . By continuing to operate as a political party despite this ruling, the MNO places itself in constant conflict
with the state, thus creating and susta ining an example of
hi gh-caste llindu dominance of the political.
By contrast, the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh, and the
single ethnic-group focused organizations that constitute
it, insist that they are non -political, social organizations.
These organizations seek to promote the "languages, religions and cultures" of janajatis and to raise public awareness about issues affecting j anajatis through publiC'ations
and conferences. Their work can be seen as political in that
they operate as "pressure groups," working to influence
members of the government to form policies that will uplift janajatis and pursuing incremental changes within the
present system. For example, during the drafting of the 1990
Constitution, the Janajati M ahasangh made recommendations to the Constitution Commission; and later the organization spearheaded opposition to teaching Sanskrit as a
compulsory language in schools. As the widespread currency of the term "janajati" reflects, this strategy of accommodation is the prevalent and legal way to make claims
on the basis of ethnicity in post 1990 Nepal. Furthermore,
some activists in these organizations have argued, it is a
more effective way to secure rights for janajatis at the
present moment than attempting to directly seize political
power.

Though the MNO's founder-president, Gopal Gurung,
is sometimes assumed to comprise the extent of the MNO,
the party has an active "grassroots" base of support with
active party commjttees in 8 districts. The MNO's stronghold is in the rural areas of Ilam district, where it has had
limited electoral success at the village level. Given the
party's relatively sh011 history, relatively undeveloped party
structure, and lack of financial resources and legal status,
the MNO has been surprisingly successful in elections. In
the first local elections in 1991, the party won 57 seats at
the village level and managed to gain control of several
Village Development Committees. In 1994 national elections, the party received the third most votes after the large,
long-established and well-funded Congress and Communist parties, and received more votes that the third most
popular party in the nation overall , the Rastriya Prajatantra
Party. As Articles 112(3) and 113(3) of Nepal's 1990 Constitution forbid the Election Commission from registering
political parties that are explicitly community or region
based , the MNO is an "illegal" party. The MNO is presently the only political party that has been denied registration on this basis and still continues to put up candidates
for election, albeit as independents. Other identity based
political parties either boycott elections, or have widened
the definition of the community who they claim to repre-

As a strategy to gain political power at the national
level, the MNO's participation in electoral politics as a small
and unregistered party is of limited effectiveness. (We may
also question the effectiveness a violent takeover of the
state, the MNO 's other plan.) At the village level, however, taking the format of political party has enabled the
MNO to include people in its membership who are not
brought into the janajati organizations . Political pa11ies are
able to mobilize a wide sector of the population, because
people can take part in them and align themselves with
them simply by voting for them . Thus although MNO leaders and activists come from among the tulo mane he of the
village, ordinary villagers also consider themselves to be
part of the MNO and call themselves "Mongols"- whereas
they feel alienated from the social organizations which
emphasize writings, formal speeches, and cultural entrepreneurship. As one uneducated woman who supports the
MNO and wasn't involved in the local Gurung organization told me, "they probably only let people who can read
or write take part in those organizations." So by being a
political party the MNO is able to create space for a wide
range of types of participation in the movement. Even
though the MNO has a margi nal position in the movement
at the national level because of its confrontational stance
towards the state, at the village level it is able to create a
kind of populist base.
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The question of the extent to which the MNO is engaged in the sa me project as the Janajati Mahasangh was a
central topic of debate among MNO members. Since the
Janajati Mahasangh as a coa lition has a very limited presence in Ilam District, the debate focused on how the MNO
should relate to the sin gle-ethnic group focused "social
organi zations" which compose the Janajati Mahasangh.
Most MNO supporters perceived the work and goals of the
social organizations and the MNO to be compatible, and
mutually enhancing. Individuals asserted that the social
organizations create support for the MNO by raising
people's awareness and by encouraging Mongols to break
away from Hinduism. Other people described how joining
the MNO led them to get involved in the social organizations . The MNO encourages Mongols to become "not
Hindu" and look for "their own language, reli gion and culture" but only the social organizations offer Mongols specific cultural identities.
MNO leaders, however, criticized the social organizations and urged other leaders, in particular, to refrain from
taking part in any of their activities or programs. First, MNO
leaders argued that the social organizations' emphasis on
promoting language, religion, and culture could mislead
and confuse people into believing that this is the entire goal
of activism. Uplifting Mongol languages and cultures is
meaningless, they insisted, without the power to institutionalize the use of these languages and cultures- "like
growing cash crops without a market to sell them in ," as
one MNO leader often explained.
Second, the leaders criticized the social organizations
for promoting individual ethnic group identities, rather than
Mongols as a coalition, which could fracture the unified
Mongol identity and politi ca l block. MNO leaders also
expressed fear that if they participated in social organi zations associated with single ethnic organizations, they could
be seen as aligned with one ethnic group more than with
other ethnic groups. As one leader stated, "We are fighting for the freedom of all Mongols, not just one group."
This ethnographic readin g of the MNO raises so me
important iss ues in considering the janajati movement at
large. It is important to remember that what may be an effective strategy for an organization at the national level
may not be so effective at the village level, and vice versa.
The challenge of creating a unified , concrete identity from
a heteroge neous population without negatin g the multipl e
identities within the group is a critical issue for the janajati
movement. It is also a central problem for all nationali st
projects, and thus, exa mining the debates over this iss ue in
this movement in Nepal ca n shed light on ethnic and nationalist politics elsewhere.
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Karl-Heinz Kramer
Nepa l's ethnic groups are still lack ing integrat ion and
parti cipation in the modern democratic Nepa li state. But
their situat ion has, neverthe less, improved co mpared to
pdnchayat times. The guarantee of fundamental rights is
much safer today. Espec ially the right of freedom of opin ion and expression and the freedom to form orga nization s
(article 12) have helped the ethnic elites to make their arguments heard among their own groups and in the general
publi c.
The greatest problem is still the attitude of the Nepali
state. There is hardly any organization outside the ethnic
camp that really wants to understand the ethnic argumentation. Politicians may be talking about participation of ethnic groups and suppressed castes, but the facts speak a different language, and there is hardly any change in attitude
in sight. Another outstandin g example are the human ri ghts
organi zations which have come into ex istence in greater
number. They may be talking about indigenous groups, but
like the political parties they, too, are dominated by members of high Hindu castes, especially Bahuns. Many of these
people cannot understand the arguments of the ethnic leaders, since they have never learnt to vi ew the Nepali state
and society from the ethnic perspective because of the onesidedness of the national education system.
Last month I have taken part in a conference organized
by POLS AN in Kathmandu on the topic of "democratization and development of civil society in Nepal". There I
have presented a paper on this topic against the multiethnic
background of the country. This paper dealt especially with
the lega l si tuation on the one hand and the implementing
politica l sphere on the other hand. Even though I had already chosen a moderate style of argumentation , my paper
set off a controversial di scuss ion almost di sregarding the
other partly very interestin g papers. On e Bahun (Dwarika
Nath Dhungel) even turned my arguments on the problems
of integration and participation into the opposite stating I
wanted to disintegrate Nepal. And even in the press my
arguments were distorted. Spotlight (issue of 26 January),
for exa mpl e, stated me to have argued that Nepalese ethnic
groups are a threat to Nepal 's integrity supporting Dwarika
Nath Dhungel 's biting critics that there is no reason to believe that there is any such threat of ethnic conflict.
I take these reaction s as proof th at the ethnic argumentation is havin g an effect. And with this I will turn over to
the se t of themes derived from Bill 's and Susan's discussions . If we speak about a ''janajati movement" then we
must be aware, that we are not talkin g about a coherent
movement but more about a ge neral process of growin g
ethnic awareness. Wh en we are talking here about the
janajati , then we first of all think of Nepal's divergent eth-
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nic groups. But we must also be aware that in recent years
these groups have been joined in their action by the soca ll ed suppressed or untouchab le castes. All these groups
have in common that they have been disadvantaged in the
modern Nepali state in respect to lega l ri ghts and to politica l, soc ial and economic participation. Even if it is not a
sin gle movement, all these groups, nevertheless, have a
simil ar fate, sim ilar intentions, goa ls, definitions and strategies. And they have founded organizations of their own
representing their interests against the Nepali state and its
central elites. It thus makes sense to talk about a "janajati
movement."
Nevertheless I see some differences between those organizations that started with social issues and only became
political in the second end (to these groups I especially
count the organizations of the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh)
and those organizations that predominantly work on a political basis and call themselves political parties, like the
Mongol National Organization of Gopal Gurung. The latter again took a very radical stand when I met him last
month, distancing himself from the current Nepali state.
The groups of the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh take a much
milder approach, even though one cannot deny that there
are radical political figures also within that group. Suresh
Ale Magar and Padma Ratna Tuladhar, for example, actively took part in celebrations of the NCP (Maoist) on the
completement of three years of)ana yuddha that took place
in New Delhi.
Even though these persons differ from the argumentation ofGopal Gurung, who distances himself from a Gurung
identity and instead speaks about a common Mongol identity of all Nepali ethnic groups, they have in common with
him that they use their social ethnic engagements for the
propagation of ajanajati political movement. Go pal Gurung
may use the term Mongol instead of janajati, but in the
end he is talking about the same thing.
The introduction of the new constitution in 1990 offered a chance not only to change the political system but
also to reconsider the state's politics of nationalism. There
can be no doubt that democracy has definitely entered Nepal
in 1990 when the new constitution was promulgated. Sovereignty exercised by the king for centuries was transfe1Ted
to the people. The constitution fmther stipulated provisions
like constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary form of government, a pluralistic society, and a civilian order. It also
reinstated popular election of the parliament based on the
principle of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.
But there are still a number of shortcomings within the
constitution itself, and there still exist undemocratic laws
enacted under the previous authoritarian regime requiring
replacement or amendment. The guarantee of fundamental
rights, like those of freedom of opinion and expression or
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of organization, has opened up chances for ethnic political
argumentation. Interestingly enough ethnic political parties are a product of the 1990s and it was only after the
people's movement that the socio-culturally oriented
janajati organizations became politically active institutions,
proving their groups as historic entities of a common Nepali
state. It was especially the self-historification of the ethni c
groups that provided them with political arguments in their
dialogue with the Nepali state.
Scholarly works on Nepal's ethnic movement are still
in an infant state. It have especially been anthropologists,
first foreigners later also Nepal is, who wrote about greater
ethno-political consciousness and organizations. Foreign
political scientists and historians working on Nepal are
comparatively few in number, but among corresponding
Nepali scholars a change in attitude can be observed in
recent years. This becomes obvious when I compare the
talks I had with them five years ago with their current argumentation. But it will take time. A special problem of
Nepali scholars is that they still recrute themselves mostly
from the Chetri and especially the Bahun groups. Under
the panchayat system these persons represented the state
ideology of politics, society and nationalism, and most of
the controversial argumentation the ethnic organizations
are confronted with today is still based on their writings.
Ethnic and thus cultural difference, which has been accepted
as given by the current constitution, is still challenged by
many Nepali intellectuals, as I have mentioned in the beginning. Political ethnic argumentation in recent years has
mainly been focussed on this, let me call it stubborn, attitude of leading Nepali scholars. Radical forces within the
ethnic movement have already started to oppose them with
militant demands and argumentations. Here I see a great
danger for the future of the ethnic movement and of the
Nepali state in general.
The janajati movement must be seen as part of development of civil society in Nepal. A well-developed civil
society potentially influences government in two ways. It
enhances political responsiveness by aggregating and expressing the wishes of the public through a wealth of nongovernmental forms of association, and it safeguards public freedom by limiting the government's ability to impose
arbitrary rule by force. Based on rights, rule of law, freedom and citizenship, civil society becomes the place for a
critical rational discourse. It is a precondition for the existence of democracy and a property of democratic states and
societies.
The 1990 constitution with its guarantee of fundamen tal rights has laid the foundation for the start of this process in Nepal. As such thejanajati movement must be seen
in the context of similar movements of the so-called untouchable castes, the women, or even the Maoists as far as
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their political arguments in favour of downtrodden sections
of Nepali society are taken into consideration. But only a
politically self-conscious civil society imposes limits upon
state power. If the political practices of a self-conscious
civil society transgress the boundaries of the state sponsored political discourse, a crisis of legitimacy of the state
results. I hope today's discussions will shed some light on
the question if such a crisis is given in Nepal.

Lauren Leve
Wellesley College

Framing Religion, Politics and Culture in ]anajati Activism: Lessons from Theravada Buddhism

Are political revolutionaries and social reformers those who would take over the state and those who ask
only for greater freedom to practice and reproduce what
they see as their indigenous cultural identities - properly
part of the same movement? One of the problems it was
suggested that speakers might address today is conceptualizing an interpretive framework for analyzing the diversity of parties and practices that fall under the rubric of
janajati politics. My remarks will be directed largely to
this concern. In part, this approach is methodologically
driven; unlike many of the others on this panel, I have not
done fieldwork on janajati activism per se, nor have I
worked with people who would identify themselves as involved in this movement. Yet, the fact that many of these
people do appear to me to be acting within the realm of
cultural politics nevertheless, provides the root contradiction that animates these comments.
To begin, I propose a brief detour through the recent
history of "religion" in the construction of the nation. As
anyone who followed the debates that surrounded the drafting and release of the VS 2047 (1991) Constitution will
know, the current wave of public contestation over the place
of Hinduism in the democratic nation-state began at the
same time as, and in dialogue with, the rise of postPanchayat assertions of cultural and linguistic
subnationalisms. Since 1990 (when I started doing fieldwork in Nepal, and hence, when my ethnographic
"memory," as it were, begins), protests and marches in favor of a secular state have given rise to publicized refusals
to celebrate Dasain, 6 and Hindu nationalist anxiety has
grown, as manifested in the heightened visibility of militant Hindu associations like the VHP, and the increasing
hostility being directed toward Christianity. Accusationsof
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See Pfaff-Czarnecka (1993) and Hangen (1997).
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"Bahunbad" by public intellectuals, Buddhists andjanajati
leaders have pointed to ways i!l which nationalized Hinduism has masked and supported Monarchial power and high
caste Hindu privilege. And Hindu nationalists and loyalists have reacted aggressively in their own defense. 7 Yet,
· to the best of my knowledge, religious organizations that
are not explicitly linked to an ethnocultural or political
agenda are generally not construed as falling within the
janajati sphere by activists or scholars, whether Nepali or
foreign. This raises the question as to why language and
culture are considered appropriate bases on which to claim
political identity, whereas in the same context, religion is
not.
My research has been on a Theravada Buddhist reform
movement which has clashed with the Nepali state in different ways at various times since the 1920s and 1930s
when it first emerged among Newar Buddhists, and which
has played an important part in re-articulating ethnic and
religious identity for many Newars since then. Theravada
Buddhists as a whole do not see themselves as appropriately involved in janajati politics. Almost all will contest
the assertion that Buddhism is in any way political; and the
collaborations between Buddhist monks and janajati activists that sprung up in the wake of thejana andolan were,
and continue to be, fiercely debated within the Theravada
community. Yet, I see important points of analogy between
the Theravada Buddhist reform and thejanajati movement,
and in the ways that Theravada Buddhists andjanajati activists are positioned by and position themselves vis-a-vis
the state. Thus it is instructive to compare their points of
contiguity and common cause, as well as of divergence
and disavowal.
There are significant structural parallels between the
Newar cultural renaissance/anti-Rana resistance at the beginning of this century of which the early Theravada reform was a part, 8 and the politicization of ethnic and religious identity today. During the 1920s and 1930s,
Theravada was a religious reform that had political implications in a state where political and religious subjectivities
were intertwined. Thus, although its robed representatives
never actually aspired to state power, their politics of culture were perceived by the Ranas as provocative nonetheless. Despite protestations that their undertaking was religious, not political, Theravada monks and nuns were expelled from Nepal twice in the first half of this century for
ordaining Hindus and women, and preaching against such

7
Many of these trends and events are also documented in
Pfaff-Czarnecka ( 1997).
8 See Gellner (1986; 1992:13-18; 1997), Lakaul (1985), Malia
(1982), Pradhan (1985 (2041 VS)), Shrestha (n.d.), Upreti
(1992).
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cultural edifices as sacrifice and the caste system. At the
same time, many of its lay devotees were jailed, fined, and
harassed.
The position ofTheravada Buddhists in relation to the
state became less problematic after 1951, due in large part
to King Tribhuvan's personal spiritual propensities. 9 But
in the months immediately following the jana an dolan, a
number of prominent Theravada monks began to attend
meetings of the Janajati Mahasangh, and they were among
the leaders of the call for the constitutional recognition of
Nepal's ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity that rocked
Kathmandu over the summer and into the fall of 1990. At
the same time as they were pressing for these political reforms, however, they were also active in a number of more
religiously-orient~d l)Ctivities, including preaching dhanna
at the meetings ofindividualjanajati associations, and organizing Buddhist training camps which aimed to propagate their putatively "pure" brand of Buddhism among ethnic groups whose religions and cultures they argued had
been "cmTupted" by a long history of Hindu domination.
In conjunction with this goal, one monastery even atTanged
the initiation of six young boys from what they explicitly
publicized asjanajati castes- one Gurung, one Magar, one
Tharu, and three Tamangs - as novice Theravada monks,
and sent them to Thailand for high school and further Buddhist training in the hope that they would return to spread
Theravada Buddhism among their native communities.
As it turned out, by 1996, four of the six boys had disrobed, rejecting their roles as representatives of their jats
to return to normal teenage life. More significantly, most
of the monks had broken with the Janajati Mahasangh by
this time; as it was explained to me, because the organization became "too political." Yet, considering that I had seen
one of the very same monks who told me this in 1995 rallying crowds at the Tundikhel in 1990, and that he himself
had been one of the ones expelled in 1944, this assertion of
an ontological distinction between the "religious" and "political" realms struck me as a strange denial of Theravada
lived experience. Briefly, I interpret this opting out of ethnic politics at least in part as an act of resistance to events
internal to janajati politics themselves- when the secular
state initiative was defeated and their partner groups moved
on to other issues and modes of organization, I suspect that
the monks felt rather marginalized, and being able to claim
a higher authority, under the sign of the religious, offered
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In the later part of his life, the King became extremely close
to the knowledgeable and charismatic Theravada monk,
Bhikshu Amritananda. For a brief period prior to the King's
death, Theravada received explicit royal recognition and some
state patronage as a result of Amritananda's influence .
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an identity-appropriate language in which to voice this protest.10 But the rhetoric makes sense only because these
domains - religion and politics - had already been con structed as separate, and differentially valued, by the state.
During the Panchayat period, the language of "religion"
was appropriated by the state, which used it to represent
itself as a domain of selflessness, service, and devotion to
tradition, authority, and the collective good, including the
traditional authmity represented by the King, whom official nationalist discourse portrayed as affectively bound to
his citizens, and as the foremost provider for the public
good. (Just think of the billboard at Ratna Park on which
King Birendra proclaims: "Just as I have affection for my
country and my people, I have that same responsibility for
my sick and hungry people." 11 ) At the same time, this moral
and moralizing state was rendered opposed to the world of
"politics," which was associated with political parties, and
represented as an anti-nationalist realm of self-interest and
greed. The result of this was the depoliticization of the state
through its identification with - and embodiment as dharma, and the conesponding vilification of what came
to be defined as "politics," a discursive production that
continues to underlie much of what is and isn't recognized
as "political" today.
I would not propose this as a full explanation for the
Theravada monks removing themselves from the avowed
ethnopoliticallandscape. But it illustrates one outcome of
the way that the Nepal state has historically positioned itself as a religious entity, and used Hindu tropes and categories in the process of governance. Religion is implicit
in identity- and identity politics- in Nepal, even when it
is not explicitly politicized in these terms. Even today, critical categories of belonging to the nation-state derive from
and reference a Brahmanical world view. This underscores
the importance of engaging with religion as an organizing
factor in ethnic and nationalist politics. To do justice to the
complex relations between nationalism, class andjanajati
identity in Nepal today, it is important to insist on an analytical language that will make sense of the political dimensions of cultural assertions without assimilating
ethnonationalism 12 to an economistic logic that assumes
that the politics of identity are in fact about commanding
resources and making material claims on the state, or oth-

10
Adams (1998) takes a similar approach in her analysis of the
political uses and implications of discourses of science by
medical doctors involved in thejana andolan .

11
"Jasari malai mero des a ra janatako mamata cha, usai gari
bhok ra rogle pidita mero janataprati mero jimmedari cha. Sri
Pane Birendra."
12

I take this expression from Tambiah ( 1996).
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erwise reducing religion to politics by other means.
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Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Nepal
The comments I make today are based on collaborative research I have done and continue to do with Kathryn
March and Mukta Singh Tamang both of whom are speaking at today's roundtable. I want to further acknowledge
the important contributions to this work made by my long
term research associate, Suryaman (Himdung) Tamang and
Amrit Yhonjan of Tamang Language and Literacy Council.
I. I should preface my remarks today with the qualification that they are Tamang-o-centric. The first point I
make is historical. Ideologies of difference in contemporary Nepal transform those which took form with the consolidation of the Hindu state of Nepal in the late 18th century. Nepal formed, for Tamang, in the exercise of violent
force by high-caste, Indo-Nepalese who deployed a hierarchical ideology conflating caste and ethnicity to organize
diversity. Tamang were conceived of as low, beef-eating,
Buddhists, subject to enslavement, unfit for military duty,
capable primarily of physical labor, and, in the west, subject to regimes of compulsory labor or rakam. In a word,
the history of Nepal is not one of the phulbaari or "garden" of the discretely flourishing blossoms of Prithvi
Narayan Shah but of domination of discrete sectors of the
Nepalese population by an elite. The term phulbaari, active in discourse about ethnicity in Nepal at least since the
fall of the Ran as in 2007 I 1950, must be seen as part of the
continuing quest for an ideology of difference but one
which, in the contemporary context, disguises the
infrastructural reality of relations of domination and subordination in Nepal. In Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, it
constitutes an active misrecognition of relations of domination. Contemporary janajati movements are a continuation of a history of opposition to relations of domination
and the ideologies that support them.
II. My second point relates to the larger transformations in political and cultural discourse that followed the
collapse of the Rana regime and the reconstruction of old
orders of domination in the panchayat era and led to the
liberalizations succeeding the People's Movement and the
new constitution in 1990. In reference to the western
Tamang, identity politics did exist in the past. Communities produced themselves as collectivities around local headmen and in opposition to the outside, especially the royal
regime of the Ran as/Shahs and the system of c01·vee labor,
in extensive and elaborate Buddhist rituals which generated power both symbolic and real in local communities.
During this period, there was no possibility for wider organization under the rubric of"Tamangness." What we think
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of as Tamang areas were involuted, cellular like units tied
in chains not unlike the chains of dial ects ofTamang lan guage. During the period of the 1950s and 1960s after the
collapse of the Rana regime, there were more organized
political actions based on identity to the northwest of
Kahmandu. Inspired in part by organizers for the Congress Party, local communities of Tamang who were severely oppressed by in-mi grating Bahun , rioted and looted .
These Bahun had, at least in Tamang recountings, acquired
land and local political influence through legal manipulations that were only possible because of their association
with dominant powers . In 1960 anti-Brahman riots occurred in what are now Nuwakot and Dhading districts
where Tamang villagers looted and drove out all Brahman
families from several villages. Troops killed and wounded
several Tamang and arrested hundreds. Mahendra used
the presence of these "Brahman refugees" in Kathmandu
as one of the pretexts for dissolving the first democratically elected govemment in 2017 v.s. and banned, one can
presume not incidentally, the first Tamang cultural association which had been organized by Santabir Lama in 2013.
Contemporary janajati organizations among Tamang
are a new urban-based movements which became possible
only after liberalizations of the new constitution. They are
distinguishable from earlier identity politics because they
are Kathmandu-based, nation-wide efforts at organization
inspired by transnational rhetorics of nation, diversity, in digenousness, and identity especially those current in
greater India . The leading Tamang ethnic organizations
have distinct political leanings if not party affiliations .
Although these organizations are based in Kathmandu, they
are beginning to influence local communities in significant ways. For instance, Tamang in the area we work, have
abandon ned the celebration Dasain as a Hindu festival and
are focussing on making Buddhist /hosar a focal context
for asserting Tamang culture in a broader alliance with ethnic associations like the Gurung who have developed , in
some areas at least, an anti-Dasain/Tihar which is celebrated
at village and district cultural centers at the time of Gurung
Lhosar. Buddhism is in many respects the rallying point
for broad opposition but is confounded, I should note, by
mass Tamang conversions to Christianity in some regions.
In the urban/village contrast, one must note the following:
1. The diversity of peoples called Tamang is substantial in
both language and culture due to the history of isolation
and regional involution . The creation of pan-Tarnang identity is an urban based political cum cultural effort at a new,
synthetic iden

tity.
2. Concerns with the preservation ofTamang language and
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culture are primarily the concern of Tamang residentially
displaced to Kathmandu or the Terai where issues of nation and diversity are especially sa lient.

monic Hindu order. The contest over what diversity and
nationalism constitute forms one of the core elements in
contemporary politi cs of cu lture and identity in Nepal.

3. At present, party division and longstanding political factions in village communities are more influential in village
life than ethnic associations at least in the western Tamang
areas where Tamang are the dominant population.

Given the cunent literacy rate in Nepal, which is only
about 39% of the total population, school education can
have only limited influence in generating consc iousness of
national scope. Nevertheless, formal ed ucation provides a
ground for produc ing a group of dominant elite who are
able to perpetuate the power to control the statecraft and
produce and reproduce consciousness, including that of
diversity and nationalism. The debate on strategies in terms
of both contents and media for gradually universalizing
schoolin g in Nepal, for example, has provided a forum for
encounters between Janjati discourse and previously dominant views. School textbooks comprise one important statedeployed means reflectin g the negotiated results of such
debate.

My final point is brief and meant to lead into the comments of my collaborators. Colonial typologies of caste
and tribe atticulated early on by scholars like Btian Hodgson
set the stage for modern anthropology which started off in
a unproblematic acceptance of the basic terms of those
typologies. These typologies, it turns out, are largely consistent with those of Hindu state ideologies leading to a
curious triangulation in the representation of difference in
Nepal where Hindu colonizers produced categories of difference which incorporated non-Indo-Nepalese which were
then applied in principle in the formative ethnology of
Nepal. These categories ironically are in significant measure the nodes of contemporary janajati organization which
are constructed as challenges to the models of the Hindu
state. They have led furthermore to the charge that anthropologists, particularly those of the western persuasion, are
fanning the flames of ethnicity. It is common for high
caste intellectuals and elite of Nepal to debunk the ethnic
movements as "constructed" but to debunk these movements is to attempt to disempower groups historically denied power in Nepal at the very moment they begin to exercise power in a challenge to the old order. An apperception of conditions of differential power based on group
membership is essential to ethnic peace in Nepal and must
begin not in the denials and defensiveness that are so common among dominant sectors of the population but in acceptance of the reality of differential power and continuing superordinate position of certain heriditary groups.

Mukta S. Tamang
Representation of Diversity in School Textbooks:

Implications for Politics of Culture and Identity in Nepal
I would like to discuss the issue of how cultural diversity is being represented in school textbooks in Nepal and
what are its implications in the politics of culture and identity in the country. The existing school textbooks, as one
of the state-owned devices, evoke the concept of diversity
to create a harmonious national culture, at the same time
reifying difference by categorizing peoples with particular
dispositions . Various ethnic activists have challenged the
ex isting state renderings of divers ity for their representations in school textbooks and other public media . They
contend that the conceptualization of the multicultural reality of Nepal in dominant natTatives legitimizes the hege-
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School textbooks, particul arly the Nepali primers titled
Mah endra Mala, and social studies from their beginning,
introduce Nepal to children with quotes from King Prithvi
Narayan Saha. A famous quote which goes "Nepal is a
garden of four vama and thirty six jat" (~ ""ffi" 'l1'f ~
~ 'fi<1cfRT it) is found across the books of various grades.
The quote is understood and interpreted in dominant modern Nepali discourse as recognition of cultural diversity
and an endorsement of the policy of harmony and co-existence.
Along this line, Prayag Raj Sharma ( 1997), for example,
suggests that the idea of cultural diversity has been a part
of and implicit in Nepal 's historical legacy. He further suggests that the state has done a great deal to create a collective consciousness of cultural diversity as a positive value.
Some of the descriptions in textbooks glorifying pluralism, appear to support the idea that the government is committed to fostering the notion of harmony and co-existence
in multicultural and multi -lingual Nepal. One example of
such text, found in a social studies book for grade 7, tells
the children the followin g:
Nepal is a country like a beautiful garden ... She is
so beautiful because of the existence of peoples with
many different castes, ethnicities, religions, customs
and qualities. (ln11'r ~ ~:GW ~ ~ ~ it ."lffit
~ ~ ~. '11'f, mt, ~'
~

TJUm

~erR·~~

!!fu -mit ~ itt)

The understanding of diversity, however, cannot be seen
separate from the project of national integration. The five
year plan for education in Nepal prepared in 1956, for example, stated its rationale as to "develop a system of education that is national in character and suited to the genius
of the people and to develop citizenship in all Nepalis."
Similarly, the new education plan of 1971 states that

HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(1-2) 2000

" ... Nepalese society will not lead to national solidarity and
independent sovereign nationhood without [a) central guidance in planned socialization (aimed) at coordinating the
various economjc and social interests, harmonizing diverse
multi -lingual traditions into a single nationhood."
How does centrally guided planned socialization harmonize diverse traditions? How are mutually contradictory concepts of diversity and national integration articulated in dominant conceptions? To bring down these contradictory concepts of diversity and uniformity to the level
of comprehension of children, the children have been told
as follows:
Development of feelings that 'we are Nepali, Nepal
is our country' will foster our nationalism. (Nllt ~
if, ~ liTI'.iT ~T lit ·qn'f ·~ ~ liTI'.iT <lf1sall\11i!>l
fWl>m ~ 1)
Nepal is our birth place. We are all Nepali. We
have no discrimination. We all are subjects of one
country. (~ liTI'iT ;J[rll ·@ r lit 1 wtT ~ 'it<mfr if 1 ~
<R ikmcr ~ 1 wtT ~ ~T<!>T ~ \I'OlT if 1)
Through these lessons children learn about themselves
as members of a single and unified nation. National integration, therefore, is an extended version of P.N. Saha's
physical unification, bringing diverse cultural, social and
economic spheres under control of the state. To meet the
further demand of modern nation building, children have
been taught several other unifying elements such as the
state prescribed slogan "our kjng, our country; our language,
our dress" (liTI'il ~ liTI'iT hr, liTI'iT 'llf!'IT liTI'iT -il>r) and a set of
national symbols drawn from Hindu symbology and active kingship (cow, flag, red blob, crown, royal crest, coat
of arms, scepter, royal standard, and national anthem). One
of the most illuminating text descriptions spread across
children's books reads as follows:
(Nepal is the name of our country. We all are Nepali
who live in Nepal. There are peoples of many different jar (caste). Bahun, Chhetri, Newar, Gurung,
Magar, Rai, Limbu are jars. There are other jars as
well. Despite many jars, we have one kjng. We
have one country. All jat do not fo llow the same
religion. Some worship Shiva, some worship Buddha, some worship Bishnu and some Devi. In Nepal
all are called Hindu.) e'rfr, ;t<m-, Tf<>SO, ~. lfiR, m,
fi;rKr ·qn'f ;;n(f lit I ffi 31'(> ;;n(f <rf.r ~ WT I "'"fu ;;n(f ·~
<rf.r liTID ~ ~ WT I liTI'.iT l1<'!<F ~ ~ ~ I ~ ;;n(f ~
u-.f ~I ;R ~~ 'l'i!T ~. ;R ~.<A~~ ;R
~'l'i!T~, l~lll ~~·~l

The following statement gives an example of further
reifying the glory of unification, through a textbook lesson
to children:
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Prithvi Narayan Saha is the founder of modern
Nepal. Had he not unified the weak and disputing
small nations of the country, we would not have
been ab le to identify ourse lves as Nepali be longing
to Nepal. ('f«fi 'lT(Tl:l1l[ '<fm ~ <rrr ~ li'r 1 ~
< m"'T m"'T ~ (l,-1l6~<11~ ~ ~ ~ -.rc:rifhfu~ m:;
3IT'iT ~ ~ < 'it<mfr 'l1"f 'ffi'f.'t P<n:MT I)
This account makes inv isible the conquered population and creates a myth of pre-unification Nepal consisting
of ethnic populations as "weak others" who frequently
fought with each other. Sporadic narratives of Nepal's different cultural groups included in various editions of the
school textbooks since the 1960s, while giving the impression of fairer representation of diversity, often portray ethnic communities in a stereotypic mode. Either through a
asymmetrical caste-based or modern development-based
evo lutionary perspective, the ethnic communities are portrayed as backward populations with particular kinds of
socia l, cu ltural and economic dispositions at the bottom
rung of the socia l ladder (Pigg 1992).
Diversity in this national integrative framework becomes an ideology of domination by inclusion. As an ideology, it has constantly been manipulated and adjusted by
the ruling elites in Nepal to perpetuate the unequal power
structure. As Harka Gurung (1998) succinctly puts it, diversity to the homogenizing state of the dominant Hindu
elites means "variation (of the peoples) not only in genus
and species but also in status and privileges ordained by
the law of the land, Muluki Ain (1854)". The unequal status is characterized by economic exploitation, political
oppression and cultural marginalization. In the educational
sector, for example, 96% of the school textbook writers
come from high caste hill Bahun, Chhetri and Newar communities and those groups accounting for 70% of the
country's total graduates.
The discourse on diversity produced by means of education, therefore, subtly but vehemently undermines the
possibility of co-existence within a plural society. As children of imagined communities, school students in Nepal
are misinformed and taught to see themselves as members
of the Hindu national community in order to promote national integration (Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Chaterjee
1993). Integrative framework with hegemonic content
would view ethnic plurality as a deterrent to co-existence
rather than as a possibility fo r mutuality.
Violence to the concept of true diversity by the state
over the last two centuries can be taken as a common genesis of the Janajati movement in Nepal. Although ethnic
organizations and political parties such as MNO, Janjati
Mahasangha, and Jan Mukti Morcha have a varieties of
approaches and goals ranging from effective implementation of constitutional provisions to radical structural
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changes, their concems are fundamentally directed toward
transformations of existing understanding and practice of
cultural diversity in Nepal.

Judith Pettigrew

Comments
Tamu Pye Llw Sangh (TPLS) ("Tamu Religious and
Cultural Organisation") is a Pokhara based Tamu (Gurung)
organisation. Tamu Pye Lhu Sangh 's self-appointed mandate is to preserve and revitalise Tamu cultural traditions
and in particular the shamanic traditions of the pachyu,
klehbri and "bonist lama" . 13 The organisation was founded
in Pokhara in late 1990 by seven men all of whom are exBritish Gurkha soldiers/officers. The founder members are
shamans, sons of shamans or members of shamanic clans.
Earlier in that year two of the founder members had travelled into the uplands in an attempt to discover if the places
chanted by pachyu shamans during theii· journey to escort
the soul(s) of the dead to the afterworld, which is also the
Tamu downward migration route, existed in the physical
landscape. Their discovery that "text" matched landscape
formed the basis for a movement to revitalise the declining
and threatened shamanic traditions which culminated in
the founding of TPLS in November 1990.
TPLS now have branches throughout west-central
Nepal and also in Kathmandu. Their kohinbo "shamanic
monastery" in Pokhara, whose architecture is based on
shamanic symbology contains a museum and also serves
as a cultural centre, a site for shamanic rituals, an office
and a meeting place. It's design has been reproduced in
miniature in several locations in different districts. The
organisation's activities include among others the celebration of Lhosar ("Tamu New Year" celebrated on 15 Poush
(end of December), the hosting of death and other shamanic
rituals at the kohinbo, the organisation of and participation
in local and national Tamu conferences and the ongoing
search for sacred geography. TPLS members are also involved in a community archaeology and ethno-history
project with researchers from the Universities of Cambridge
and Central Lancashire.
TPLS members state very clearly that they are a religious organisation and not a political one ("we are on the
religious side not the political side"). They explain that the
shamanic traditions are under threat from Buddhism, that
young people no longer want to train to be shamans, that

13

8onistlbonpo lama is the term TPLS members apply to the lamas who conduct death rituals in collaboration with the shamans
and like them include animal sac.rifice as an integral element of
their practice. In the villages they are called "purano" "old" lamas in contrast the the "naya" "new" Tibetan Buddhist lamas).
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townspeople are losing their language and that people are
forgetting how to "do things the Tamu way". In essence
people are forgetting about the cultural centrality of the
shamanic traditions and TPLS have taken on the role of
reminding them "so that we don't lose our culture". By
remindin g Tamus of the centrality of the shamanic traditions TPLS simultaneously remind people that they are not
Hindu, that the Tamu-mai have a northern origin and that
contained within the Pye ta Lhu ta is the "correct" ve rsion
of hi story. They remind people that Tamu history was rewritten by Hindus in the 17th Century and that in the rewriting one group of clans became constructed as 'superior' and the other as 'inferior'. The clans according to the
shamans pye are equal "there is no superior and no inferior
among the Tamu-mai". TPLS's stance on the relationship
between the clans, while widely s upported at an overt level
particularly in the towns, is contested often covertly by those
Tamu-mai who perceive a hierarchical relationship to exist. While membership of TPLS is free and open to all
Tamus ("by birth all Tamus are members") in reality not
everyone would want to be involved .
In spite of TPLS's claim that they are a cultural and
religious organisation their activities clearly also have a
political dimension. Their concem over loss of cultural
knowledge , language, and religious infringement is
matched by a concern to re-socialise a version of the past
based on shamanic knowledge which directly contests
Hindu interpretations of Tamu history, provides the basis
for the assertion of a Tamu identity which is non-Hindu,
and addresses the contentious issue of clan hierarchy.

Mary Cameron
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Auburn University

Ironies in the Janajaati Movement and the Politicizing
of Ethnography in Nepal: Some Cautionary Remarks
As an anthropologist and writer on lower castes in far
western Nepal, I, like the people I work with, often feel I
am outside looking in on what is written about Nepali culture. In this regard, I find the recent attention to so-called
'janajaati,' and the rapidity with which the term has entered Himalayan academic discourse, remarkable. When I
first heard the word janajaati, I translated it as "people,"
(as did many Nepali colleagues and friends unaware of"the
movement" since it literally means 'people groups.' Admittedly in the past I have worked exclusively in a village
instead of the rarified political atmosphere of Kathmandu,
I rely on spoken rather than written texts to understand
people and their culture, and I refer mostly to the history of
caste discrimination, the experience of bodily rejection
imposed on those of lower caste, and the process of disen-
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franchisement. I wondered, based on my translation of
j anajaati, was there now a unification movement in which
all barriers would be broken, a sort of second stage people's
movement following on the heels of the first? Would Nepal
again distinguish itself, following a relatively nonviolent
res to ration of democracy, as a cou ntry that could bring its
myriads of people together? Would caste barriers be broken, not through government quotas but throu g h the
people's will? The answer is no . The janajaati movement
spoken of by the few mostly men involved in it, and their
social science mouthpieces is, like the groups claiming
membership, difficult to place boundaries around . What is
ev ident about the so-called janajaati movement, however,
is that it presents many ironies that need pointing out. To
call this era in Nepal's history the janajaati-yug, as was
done recently in an article in SINHAS, is short-sighted and
political, and does not, in my estimation, represent the significant movements taking place in Nepal. At a time when
international dollars and Foucaultian ideas help to constitute the practices by which groups in Nepal make their
boundaries and stake their identity claims, the recently
coined term janajaati should not be used uncritically as an
indigenous term. For in fact its circulation seems exclusively Kathmandu-based, and its translation as "ethnic
minority" is transparently of western politics.
Concerned that I was unaware of something important
about to happen as the next era of anthropology in Nepal
unfolded (after all, a yug is a long time), I did a quick study
of the janajaati phenomenon dming the last weeks of my
own research this past summer. I interviewed some prominent and controversial Tamang and Thakali leaders, asked
Nepali friends and colleagues what they thought of the
movement, and attended a UN-sponsored conference in
Kathmandu on the world 's indigenous people (in Nepali,
aadibaasi). The latter event was most revealing . The prominent members of the janajaati movement allended it, and
gave speeches using the two tetms interchangeably. Though
e veryone had the UN guidelines for the identification and
protection of the world's indigenous people (those whose
cultures are at threat of ex tinction due to political, economic and environmental upheaval), the groups in Nepal
to whom 'indigenous' clearly applies in this sense, the
Chepang and Santa!, were glaringly absent from the proceedings. I wondered throughout the short conference if
the UN would accept the indigenous status of those making speeches.

ticipation in the UN-sponsored indigenou s people's movement. A seco nd criterion is a ru story of state-sponsored discrimination based on ethni city (religion, language, soc ial
organization), in the pas t and now; this is the thrust behind
the politics of the movement. They often characterize the
latter as hav ing been "conquered" by another dominant
group (read Hindus). However, the first criterion of indigenous status is difficult to prove, and does not always presuppose the second one of discrimjnation. For example,
while the Newars are the indisputable indigenous people
of Kathmandu, they are not particularly interested in the
janajaati movement, perhaps because as a group they are
relatively successful. The ease of identifying the largest
ethnic group in Nepal, the Newar, ends with it. All other
groups' origins are less than clear, a fact that keeps the
janajaati movement ambiguous and questionable to those
on the outside. Are the Sherpa an ethnic minority, according to the movement's criteria? If so, on what basis? They
are not indigenous people, and it is unclear which of their
rights have been violated. The people of Mustang do not
really know what to call themselves . They reject the term
'bhotay', and many have simply adopted the last name
Lama.Are the Thakah a bounded ethnic minority or an indigenous group? Hard to prove, since some claim that the
Thakali as a group is less than a hundred years old, having
chosen their name from the Thak Kola near where they
live. What about the Khaas of far western Nepal? They are
an ancient group in Nepal, yet one would be hard pressed
to locate them in the centuries of intermarriage that have
charactetized their rustory. Finally, groups who are the most
endangered, the Chepang and the Santa!, are only marginally involved in either the janajaati or aadibaasi movements.
Second, as has already been pointed out, the movement conflates janajati with adibasi .

From this admittedly short exploration, there aie four
points I would like to make about the politics ofthejanajaati
movement in Ne pal. First, it is unclear who qualifies as an
ethnic minority. Leaders have established criteria of what
a j anajaati is, but these are debatable on several grounds.
An important criterion is an indi genous status, and it is on
this basis that the janajaati movement has justified its par-

Third, the movement's leaders seek to correct what they
rightfully claim has been state-supported and legislated
discrimination (within the army, the schools, etc.) against
certain groups. They want equal treatment under the law.
Here, regrettably, I find the greatest irony of the so-called
janajati movement. For while on the one hand their legitimacy claims cite discrimination toward them , most if not
all these groups have themselves, over the decades and
centuries, adopted the most discriminatory practice of Hinduism, social, economic and religious marginalizing of
lower castes. When I pressed janajaati leaders on this point,
they said that at times in their history adopting certain Hindu
practices was necessary, such as untouchability, or risk ostracism and possible imprisonment. In effect, because they
fe lt dominated, they also needed to dominate. Would they,
then, welcome the most oppressed groups, the untouchables, into their movement? Lower castes would technically meet the criteria of janajaati participation- oppression by a dominant group, development of their own Ian-
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guage, state-supported discrimination. When asked, the
janajaati leaders thought they would not want them involved, since untouchables have their own dalit organizations. Would they consider relinquishing their own discrimi natory practices for the obvious contradiction they present ·
to the ir own move ment? They, again , thought not because
of the present culture of Nepal. It is these sorts of contradictions that ethnographers of the janajati movement need
to consider.
Turning to my last point, and the final irony of the
janajaati movement is its sexism . They mostly exclude
women. On this point, leaders (men) claim that janajaati
women are equal to men, within their cultural groups, and
therefore not in need of equal protection under the law. In
contrast to these claims, though, anthropologists of ethnic
minorities in Nepal have not concluded that women have
equal status in all the groups, though often they have greater
economic power than their high caste Hindu counterparts.
Though under current Nepali law women still cannot inherit land equally with men, leaders in the women's movement find little participation from women of ethnic minorities.
I would caution against assuming a Nepali-wide and
vibrantjanajati movement that is indigenous and well supported by the people, or that proposes viable measures to
right the wrongs imposed on non-Hindus . The Nepali government has changed many of its discriminatory laws, and
has introduced school texts in ethnic languages such as
Maithili, with more in the works. The govemment has done
little, however, to end two entrenched forms of discrimination- against lower castes (16-20% of Nepal's population) and against women . It is the dalit and women's movements, as well as the growing efforts to protect Nepal's
environment, that I feel are significant movements with
lasting consequences for large numbers of people.

Kathryn March

Triangulating Tamang ethnohistory: the production of
identities in colonial encounters (a collaborative project
of David Holmberg, Kathryn March, Mukta Singh Tamang,
and Amrit Yonjan)

Introduction and general scope of the project
Brian Hodgson served the British Ernpit:e during much
of the first half of the 19th century, first in India, then Nepal.
He was one of those remarkable civil servants who not only
administered British rule, but also imagined himself a
scholar, learning several languages and researching a wide
variety of topics-about wildlife, botany, linguistics, reli-
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gion and society. His writings influenced the course of
South Asian studies profoundly. Among his unpublished
papers, archived in the India Office Library, is "Murmiharu
ko kulachar" (~ ~) or, as he rendered the titl e
hirnself, 'Manners and customs of the Murmi .' 1 'Murmi'
is the name Hodgson appli ed to (at least some of) the
peoples today known in the central Himalayas as 'Tamang.'
Tamang, today, number some 600,000 persons, living
throughout the middle hills of Nepal, making them the largest single ethnic (formerly known as 'tribal') group in
Nepal. Tamang peoples came originally from the central
Asian plateaus to become peasant subsistence agriculturalists in Nepal. They speak dialects closely related to Tibetan, practice Buddhism and respect its textual specialist
lama-s, as well as embracing a vigorous shamanic tradition. Unlike lowland Nepali society, Tamang communi ties are not organized along caste lines, according to which
endogamous groups are explicitly ranked in terms of titual
purity and occupational pollution; instead, Tamang have
unranked exogamous clans. Tamang incorporation into
modern Nepal has been problematic: for two hundred years,
Tamang rents, taxes and especially con1ee labor were essential to the creation of the state of Nepal, but Tamang
peoples have been otherwise excluded from modern opportunities, such as education, civil service, and mercenary
military service by the social, religious and political practices of the Hindu state. Nepal nationalists are proud of
the fact that Nepal was never colonized by any outside
forces; Tamang nationalists grapple with a history of considerable internal colonization by caste Nepali forces.
Hodgson's folio Murmiharu ko kulachar, dated Saturday,
Jesth I, 1904 BS (Bikram Sambat =ca. 1847 AD) is part of
the MSS Eur Hodgson (Vol 56: folios 64-78); it comprises
fourteen oversized pages handwritten in somewhat archaic
Nepali and is without question the oldest documentary evidence specifically about Tamang cultural practice.

"Murmiham ko kulachar" is a fascinating document.
It was produced in a three-party interaction: Brian Hodgson,
working with and through a literate scribe-assistant, to interview a Tamang man from a village to the north and east
of the Kathmandu Valley. The proposed collaborative
project has two primary aspects: first, to glean from the
document itself all possible evidence about the three individuals involved and their respective investments in their
interchange and, second, to analyze interviews of contemporary Tamang individuals regarding the document, its
details and significance. The overarching objectives are to
refine anthropological understanding of colonialism to in clude the role of dominant elites in processes of internal

1

MSS Eur Hodgson Vol 56: folios 64-78, dated Saturday, Jesth
I, 1904 VS (1847 AD).
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colonialism, to add to our understanding of the genesis,
codification and contemporary redeployment of Tamang
identity, to explore possibilities for integrating scholarly
work constructively with Tamang cultural revival movements and ethnic identity politics, and, finally to further
clarify the importance of working collaboratively with local Tarnang including activists to collect, interpret, make
public, and preserve their cultural artifacts.

The document and its significance for understanding
Tamang ethnic identity
As a written text, "Murmiharu ko kulachar" follows
many of the conventions of government documents from
Nepal of the same period: the way in which it is dated,
framed and scrupulously identifies its interviewee not only
by name, but by locality. The rest of the document outlines a sequence of major life cycle rituals, beginning with
childbitih rites and ending with funerary ones, with considerable attention to ritual detail. A careful reading of this
document reveals traces of all three of its original interlocutors. Although it is written largely as a monologic
record of statements attributed to the Tamang interviewee,
it shows clear traces both of the structure of Hodgson's
questions and of the interventions of the translator-scribe .
The surface contours of the document, then, can be read to
unravel some of the mysteries of its production at the intersection of three differently interested parties.
Hodgson (born 1800 - died 1894) began his career in
1816 in the Indian Civil Service, aiTiving in India in 1817.
From 1820-1842, he served as the first official British Resident and, at the time virtually only, European to live in
Kathmandu. After a brief return to England, Hodgson came
back to retire and continue to work on his scholarly papers
from 1844-1858 in Dmjeeling, which must have been where
the interview for this "Murmiharu ko kulachar" document
took place. We know something of Hodgson's style of work
from his primary biographer, Hooker, and from Hodgson's
own reports (in Miscellaneous Essays Vol 2): he apparently liked to prepare lists of questions in advance, then
allow a pundit in his employ to pose the questions and
record the answers; although Hodgson is not reported to
speak much during these exchanges, he was allegedly often physically present. His questions clearly reflect both
British colonial concerns and his own scholarly understandings of South Asian society.
We know something in general about Hodgson's assistants, although not about the specific assistant working with
him on "Murmiharu ko kulachar." According to contemporary scholars in Nepal, Hodgson regularly employed at
least three known assistants, each of whom had a significant career as pundits, writers and intellectuals in his own
right: Khardar Jit Mohan was named as Hodgson's scribe
for the intluentiall848 survey; Arnritananda was appointed
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as the official Pundit for the British Residency and is the
author of an 1831 AD grammar of his own right (as described in work by his descendant Kamal P. Malia; Shiva
Sankar, too, seems to have been a frequent translator for
Hodgson (and accompanied the eminent Prime Minister
Jan g Bahadur on his trip to Europe). Evidence internal to
the document suggests that the assistant working with
Hodgson in Darjeeling on Saturday, the 1st of Jesth-month,
1904 Bikram Sam bat (BS = 184 7 of the Christian Era),
was probably a high caste man from the Newar community-the ethnic group dominant in the Kathmandu Valley
and associated with its many high cultural traditions. In
particular, throughout the document, there m·e misspellings
of the sort typically made by native-Newari speaking persons bilingual into Nepal, such as:

<miT'lfu

~ (('!41 !'{ <11 { 'l1l<1 ~

"lffi[

~ iif'IT'l

<Ffl lffifl1T

6lf<;r ~ ll'if3 ~~~I~~~ I
~~.'llT('lll;;J'R~I

After this, the new mother is fed rice and chicken,
with spices and ground jwanu. Fenugreek seed is
fed after it is fried in oil. Jwanu makes mother's
milk come in. Fenugreek binds the body; rice beer
is served to the mother.
In this short passage alone several words are spelled
according to common Newari mispronunciations including s16, d]l7, and hfb. These misspellings bespeak the
scribe's own ethnicity, but throughout the document there
are, as well, other revealing linguistic and stylistic movements. The inclusion ofTamang terms for certain items or
rituals sometimes appears to index practices so outside high
caste expectations that the scribe is obliged to note them
and occasionally comment on them.
About Dhan Krishna Yonjen, the Tamang person who
was interviewed some 150 years ago, so far, we know only
what the document records. He (we are reasonably confident he was a man) came from a village called Phulbari or
'Flowergarden' for which there are several possible contemporary candidates, in the Timal region, still a very important Tamang area of residence, lying precisely within
the four boundary points named in the original document,
as the opening passages of the document describe:
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Auspiciously dated the year 1904 (VS) Jesth 1st the
7th day (Saturday): Their customary rites written
according to the oral testimony of Dhan Krishna
Yonjen from Phulbari Village, Temal, called by them
Lajyang Timal.
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Their place of origin lies west of Sanga, east of
Tamva Kosi, south ofDolakha, north of Mortidunga;
within these (boundaries), they are called the eighteen clans of the twelve Tamang.
This Dhan Krishna Yonjen seems quite knowledgeable
about many aspects of Tamang ritual practice, much of
which is recognizably consonant with contemporary practice, but his knowledge does not exceed that of an ordinary
adult layperson. He does not, for example, offer any ritual
recitations associated with any of the practices, as either a
lama (a specialist in Buddhist text) or a bombo (a shaman)
almost certainly would have.

The project triangulating the production ofTamang identity in Nepal

Building upon the translation work and analysis already
done, as well as several interviews of various contemporary Tamang, we want to show how the vision of Tamang
identity produced in this text results from a complex colonial, national, and ethnic history. The specific work of this
international collaborative project is part of a larger ongoing project that David Holmberg and Kathryn March have
been conducting since 1993 on the genesis ofTamang identity in Nepal. In this portion of that work, we plan to work
with Mukta Singh Tamang and Amrit Yonjan during the
1999-2000 winter intersession to complete analysis of the
document itself and its related contemporary interviews to
show the interplay of British colonial and scholarly interests with those of the elite national interests of the scribeassistant and those of the local Tamang informant.
We will be focusing specifically upon those moments
in the document when each viewpoint dominates. For example, we believe we can show how in some instances the
caste-based understanding of identity as embedded in the
life cycle of Sanskritic rites of passage dominates. In the
description of birth ritual, for instance, the document
records:
~~

After this, they have to give a payment/gift (yon) to
the lama. For a son, 4 anna, for a daughter 2 anna
must be given.
No contemporary Tamang interviewed could imagine
any context, past or present, in which Tamang people would
do different birth rituals for girls as opposed to boys. Nor
is the idea that the birth of girl children should be less ritually heralded a particularly British one. Here, the inevitable inference is that idea that girls' rituals should be hastier
and less elaborate probably originated with the scribe-assistant, according to whose high caste expectations these
differentials would be commonplace.
There are important observations to be made about the
interplay of high caste and British social ideology through
this document. Too often, studies of the colonial encounter focus upon the European domination of the local without adequately analyzing the role of local elites. This work
with the Hodgson papers will help show how local elites
(true 'subalterns') in South Asia have had pivotal roles in
formulating scholarly understanding of the region . In
Munniharu ko kulachar, in particular, it is important to
understand how the performance of religious life cycle rituals became the primary markers of ethnic identity to the
exclusion of other social, political and economic forces.
Although Tamang need to be understood as peasant farmers, who were excluded from virtually all emergent state
opportunities at the same time that they were expected to
provide most of the manual labor upon which that state
was built, this Hodgson document formulates them primarily in terms of life cycle rites. This view, which certainly
became Hodgson's, is remarkably consonant with that of
high-caste Hindu parbatiya-s in Nepal, whose privilege it
protects even more than it secures European dominion.
In other passages, however, the Tamang point of view
does not yield to the expectations of caste. In the description of marriage rituals, for instance, the scribe-assistant
records both the permissibility of patrilateral cross-cousin
marriage and of respectful flows of behavior and gifts going from the groom's family to the bride's. Both of these
would be unthinkable in a high caste world.
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They have to the naming ceremony on the 9th day
(after the birth) if (the baby is) a son and on the 8th
day if it is a daughter. They invite a lama (for the
ceremony).
And
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Bilw laba. Bachan chlwna laba. According to their
marri age customs, marriage with the mother's
brother's son and the father's sister's son is permitted.
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When they get to her house and give the gifts, both
the daughter and the son-in-law bow down to her
mother and father. The daughter lifts her mother's
feet and bows to them . She bows to her father with
her head at his knees; he lifts her head with his hands.
Then the son-in-law also touches his mother-inlaw's feet as he bows down to her.
Most striking of all, however, are the passages on sati
recorded in this document, which I reproduce in their entirety below. Sati, of course, is the self-immolation of widows on their husbands' funeral pyres. Along with footbinding and female genital mutilation, sati (as many other
writers have explored) stood as an important icon for the
British of the barbarism of the non-western world. Efforts
to eradicate sati regularly reminded British colonial officers in South Asia of their self-proclaimed civilizing nussian. This passage leaps into the record so completely
outside of the otherwise dominant organization of life cycle
rituals that we can fairly hear Hodgson 's explicit question .
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goods, debt, interest, or trade he took or gave, as
well as whatever this way or that, with or without,
paying out whatever ?tenth, sixth or quarter share
of profit that's due, balan cin g all trade, the sati
comes forth from the house.
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The corpse is taken out in front by the lama first as
always according to custom. After this, putting and
cmTying the sati in a palanquin, she is carried off.
Distributing uncooked rice and money here and
there to the gods, they go.
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Making conversation all the way, according to the
customs of forever, taking them onto a high hill,
digging a pit, building a pyre platform and getting
ready, they carry and place the corpse on the pyre
platform and the lama does janya. He throws barley and sesame seed.
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In the past they didn't have the custom of going in
sati . ............... Nowadays one or two go. They don't
forbid it. The one who followed her husband in
death according to the custom of sati, just like a
parbatya, saying "Ram," pours water on her head.
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After [she] does all this, it is not possible to forbid
her [doing or becoming sati]. They invite and bring
a lama to do yanya and right afterwards taking along
a cow, milk, barley, sesame seed, clarified butter,
and acheta, they have to take her to the cremation
grounds.
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After that, saying that they will show Dudh Kundh
to the sati, they make the sati look into a bronze
bowl of cow's milk and, after finishing doing that,
the sati, on the pyre platform with her own husband, keeping him on her right side, embracing him,
lies down.
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After that, saying the sati might get out of the pyre
platform, so that she won't be able to get out, tying
her to a pole, pressing firewood on top of her, making a big barrier, they put her there and the son (if
they have a son) lights the fire; if they don't have a
son, the older and younger brothers light the fire;
they start the fire.

In the house, the sati must take care of the affairs
of her own husband, makin g good on whatever
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Whistling loudly from all four sides of the pyre platform, making loud noises with all kinds of instruments, shouting "HaHaHa," not letting the sati's
words get out, they make loud noises. They let the
pyre platform be completely destroyed and pressing down with the wood and firewood of it, doing
this, they bum the sati and, as always, bathe right
after leaving the cremation grounds and, as always,
doing the rituals all along the path, they get home.
As always, they give the malami-s food and drink,
and, as always, everyone goes home to their own
houses.

~ ~ crrft' fu'1 ~ il:o1 ~ ~ ' ~ ~
~ ~ nn<f<1l<fr ~ ~ ~ f<c!f.t l"lU '
'l!ftf~~~~'<i'i<.J;~q{f'f{liTI

Avoiding pollution for three days, for three whole
days, as always, according to the customary practices since forever and building an inheritance for
both husband and wife, they do what is called doing the purifications of gyawalmva according to
ancient custom and they need two sacred sculptures.
All the other things are the same.
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To put?, to light lamps, to open the way for salt and
oil, whatever previously described rituals, as described above, everything is the same as for all death
observances . They don't have to do anything special [for a sati].
Discussions about whether or not Tamang ever practiced sati were heated in our various interviews. Most
Tamang people were quick to assert that they did not. One
incident of a Tamang sati was reported . Amrit Yonjan is
following up on that report with some additional interviews.
We think that it is likely to be a case involving aTamangorigin woman who had bee n taken into (often bor~d ed) do-
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mestic service in an elite and hi gh caste household in
Kathmandu and who might have been expected to sati along
with other women in the household . The passage itself is
interesting in, first, its oblique state ment that 'sa ti is not
forbidden' and, next, in its assertion that, when done, it is
done "just like a parbatya," which is the term of reference
for caste Hindus; the remainder of the passage recites San skritic passage with only the most passing references to
Tamang mortuary practice.
All these examples point to a much more nuanced understanding of both European and internal colonization in
the Nepali context. Rather than documenting the absolute
domination of British ideas and interests, there is a richer
weave. Hodgson 's fascination with life cycle ritual coalsces
well with caste Hindu idealizations about the centrality of
life cycle rituals as the defining marks of identity, but not
about the legitimacy of sati. Tamang reliance upon lamas to pe1form many of their rituals can, in some ways, be
transposed with the caste Hindu prevalence of Brahmin
priests. Over the life course idealized in these rituals, however, the centrality of maiTiage to caste Hindu constructions of life contrasts sharply with the Tamang emphasis
upon death rituals as the most important. In these, and
many other, examples, this document is an important record
of how identities were formed in the colonial and
postcolonial period.
In the contemporary context, the various debates ge nerated by this document, and the meetings and interviews
we have done about it, need to be understood as part of
recent developments in ethnic identity politics in Nepal.
Since the political changes of 1990, which limited the powers of the monarchy under a new national constitution which
promised substantial freedoms, including rights to a free
press, use of languages other than Nepali, and electoral
politics, members of many previously suppressed ethnic
groups have been trying to understand the history of their
exclusion from national politics and opp011unities. Through
the formation of various ethnic pride associations, they have
been trying to (re)write their histories. The record of their
engagement with this document provides important insights
into these more modern processes of identity formation as
well.
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